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Courts have consistently struggled with the conflicting policy 
goals of environmental and bankruptcy law.1 Without Supreme Court 
guidance, lower courts have resorted to what has been deemed a case-
by-case approach of balancing these competing interests.2 The 
cauldron of bankruptcy and environmental issues has been bubbling 
for some time and has now reached a boiling point.3 The response 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., University of Notre Dame. 
1 See Robert E. August, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy, 1 S.C. ENVTL. 
L.J. 72, 72 (1992). 
2 Id. at 80. 
 3 In 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that during 
the next fifty years, voluntary bankruptcy petitions would be filed by twenty-three to 
thirty percent of the owners or operators of waste disposal facilities. U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS 
JEOPARDIZED WHEN FACILITIES CEASE OPERATING 18 (1986), available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/d13t3/129359.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE]. Today, the EPA estimates that one in four Americans lives within three 
miles of a hazardous waste site. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
SUPERFUND: FUNDING AND REPORTED COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITIES 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08841r.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T 
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from Congress and the Supreme Court, however, has been virtually 
non-existent.4 
Metaphors of Homeric proportions have been written about the 
state of environmental claims in bankruptcy, describing the competing 
interests as a veritable “clash of titans” of law and policy with 
conflicting priorities.5 A debtor cannot get a fresh start as well as pay 
for environmental obligations.6 A cleanup order cannot be treated 
comparably with other injunctive relief while receiving administrative 
priority.7 
The Seventh Circuit recently commented on one of the many 
unresolved issues plaguing the intersection of environmental law and 
bankruptcy—the discharge of injunction orders under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).8 This Note discusses the 
current circuit split representing the different ways that courts have 
defined rights to payment under section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy 
Code9 and the Seventh Circuit’s definitive holding in United States vs. 
Apex Oil Company, Inc.10 First, this Note argues that the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding, that the environmental obligation at issue in Apex 
                                                                                                                   
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE]. Litigation costs, including bankruptcy issues, comprise 
between $25 million and $50 million annually. Id. at 14. 
4 Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in 
Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 333 (2004). 
5 Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligation: 
Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REV. 137, 137 (1991). 
6 See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 509 
(1986). 
7 Courts are divided on whether environmental cleanup costs should receive 
administrative priority. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (“cleanup costs assessed post-petition where there has been a pre-petition 
release or threatened release of hazardous waste are entitled to an administrative 
priority under the Bankruptcy Code”). Contra In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 
786, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“[a] duty to clean up an environmental hazard created 
pre-petition is generally not one of the obligations entitled to priority under the 
Bankruptcy Code”).  
8 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter RCRA], 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6902(b) (2006); United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009). 
9 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006). 
10 Apex, 579 F.3d at 734. 
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was not a “right to payment” and hence not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, is the correct interpretation of the bankruptcy provision as 
well as the environmental statute. This Note then discusses the 
implications of the Seventh Circuit’s holding and the several equitable 




A. Environmental Law and Policy 
 
 State and federal environmental laws generally have as their 
purpose the regulation and elimination of dangerous pollution.11 To 
effectuate broad statutory mandates, environmental laws vest the 
President, and thus the EPA, with extensive power.12 Among its 
preventative and remedial functions, the EPA has a continuing duty to 
identify sites releasing hazardous substances.13 The sites, ranked in 
order of priority, comprise the National Priorities List (NPL).14 
Environmental statutes also work retroactively, with expansive 
liability provisions that reach third parties, including parent 
companies, shareholders, corporate successors and lenders.15 Common 
                                                 
11 See, e.g. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (2006) (endeavoring to further the 
Congressional policy of minimizing the present and future threat to human health 
and the environment posed by solid and hazardous wastes).  
12 Exec. Order No. 12, 580, § 1(b)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (Jan. 23, 1987), 
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 note at 291–95 (1993); see Kelley v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (President has delegated primary 
authority for enforcement and direct remedial action regarding environmental 
statutes to the EPA). 
13 Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1003. 
14 Id. Through the end of the 2007 fiscal year, the EPA classified 1,569 sites as 
NPL sites, from a list of over 47,000 hazardous waste sites potentially requiring 
cleanup actions. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 4. 
15 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(hereinafter CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, 9607(a) (2006); see United States 
v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 67 (1998) (parent company may be charged with 
derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary’s actions); Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 955–56 (7th Cir. 1999) (shareholder not 
immunized from CERCLA liability where he personally operated polluting landfill); 
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remedies for environmental claims include—depending on the 
statute—clean-up orders, civil penalties, and criminal sanctions 
against responsible parties.16 
Generally, environmental laws authorize one or more of three 
courses of action. First, the government can undertake clean-up 
actions, including removal and remedial measures.17 Where the 
response is contingent with the National Contingency Plan, the costs 
of the cleanup actions are subsidized by the Hazardous Substances 
Fund.18 Second, the government can order abatement actions and 
assess penalties for non-compliance.19 Third, where the government or 
a private party undertakes the environmental cleanup or expends funds 
for it, a cost-recovery action may be brought against Potentially 
Responsible Parties (PRP).20 
Although there are many federal and state statutes, two are 
particularly relevant: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the RCRA.21 
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to address the problem of 
remediating abandoned waste sites by establishing legal liability as 
                                                                                                                   
Cytec Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 644, 654 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(successor corporation liable under CERCLA where there has been a formal or de 
facto merger). 
16 See Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(defendant dry-cleaning supply business liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA for 
release of hazardous chemicals); U.S. v. Tex-Tow, 589 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir. 
1978) (defendant owners of tank barge liable under Clean Water Act for civil 
penalties under absolute liability standard); U.S. v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 109 (6th 
Cir. 1977) (defendant could properly be charged with criminal sanctions for willfully 
discharging gasoline into navigable waterway). 
 17 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2006). 
18 Id. 
19 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (2006). 
20 Section 9607 defines four classes of PRP: (1) current owner and operator; (2) 
anyone who owned or operated the site at the time of the release of toxic substances; 
(3) any person who transported toxic substances to or from the site; and (4) any 
person who accepted transported toxic substances from the site. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a) (2006). 
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well as a trust fund for environmental cleanup.22 CERCLA’s primary 
purpose is to effectuate cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate 
those who have attended to remediation of environmental hazards.23 
CERCLA establishes a complicated scheme that enables the federal 
government to respond promptly and effectively to the pervasive 
problems inherent in hazardous waste disposal.24 Ultimately, 
CERCLA promotes the private allocation of responsibility for costs 
incurred in responding to threatened or actual releases, spills, or 
discharges of hazardous substances at existing or abandoned sites by 
laying liability at the feet of a broadly defined PRP.25 
RCRA is a comprehensive statute that governs the treatment, 
storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste.26 RCRA creates a 
“cradle to grave” regulatory framework for managing hazardous 
wastes by imposing compliance requirements on both generators and 
                                                 
 22 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6119, 6128 (noting that bill would establish program for appropriate environmental 
response to protect public health and induce persons to voluntarily take remedial 
measures); Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 334. 
 23 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 334–35. 
 24 A prima facie case for cost recovery under CERCLA is satisfied by 
establishing the following four elements: (1) the site is a facility as defined under 
CERCLA; (2) a release of hazardous substances has occurred or been threatened; (3) 
the release has caused the plaintiff to incur necessary costs of response; and (4) the 
defendant falls within one of the four categories of potentially responsible persons 
(PRPs). See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil 
Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152–54 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 25 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). 
26 Hazardous waste is defined in § 6903 as: 
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its 
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious 
characteristics may (A) cause, or significantly contribute to an 
increase in mortality or an increase in serious, irreversible, or 
incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present 
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when 
improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or 
otherwise managed. 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2006). 
 167
5
Rdzanek: Discharge of RCRA Injunctive Claims in Bankruptcy: The Seventh Ci
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
transporters of hazardous wastes, as well as owners and operators of 
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.27 
Unlike CERCLA, RCRA's primary purpose is to reduce the 
generation of hazardous waste and to ensure proper treatment, storage, 
and disposal of waste that is nonetheless generated so as to minimize 
present and future threats to human health and environment.28 This 
difference in purpose is reflected in the remedial structures of the two 
statutes.29 RCRA claims are unique because they do not authorize any 
form of monetary relief and are purely injunctive.30 
 
B. Bankruptcy Law and Policy 
 
 The bankrupt debtor’s position has been likened to being stuck 
among a “circling flock of creditors who would otherwise feast 
merrily on the debtor's carcass, with the swiftest among them realizing 
the choicest cuts.”31 To prevent a race to the courthouse, maximize the 
debtor’s assets, and preserve judicial order, there exist several 
procedural mechanisms by which debtors’ assets are liquidated or 
reorganized.32 The Bankruptcy Code aims to balance the dual goals of 
giving creditors what they are owed and providing debtors with a fresh 
economic start.33  
The “fresh start” principle is primarily achieved through two 
mechanisms: the automatic stay and the bankruptcy discharge.34 The 
                                                 
27 See Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). 
28 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 359. 
29 See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). 
30 See Jean Buo-Lin Chen Fung, Note, KFC Western, Inc., v. Meghrig: The 
Merits and Implications of Awarding Restitution to Citizen Plaintiffs Under RCRA 
§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 798 (1995) (describing the court’s equitable 
power to issue mandatory injunctions, even those that require the expenditure of 
money to perform).  
31 Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligation: 
Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REV. 137, 141–42 (1991).  
32 Id. 
33 See Katherine Porter & Dr. Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s 
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automatic stay stops creditors from being able to collect debts from the 
moment the bankruptcy is filed to the conclusion of the bankruptcy 
case.35 The automatic stay protects the debtor’s assets throughout the 
bankruptcy, guarantees that creditors will receive a fair share of the 
assets, and prevents the proverbial race to the courthouse to file 
creditor claims.36 In essence, because the costs of litigating judicial 
claims against the debtor often deplete the estate, the main purpose of 
the automatic stay provision is to preserve the estate.37 
 The most important mechanism provided to debtors to achieve 
a fresh start is the bankruptcy discharge.38 Except as otherwise 
provided in the Bankruptcy Code, a discharge in bankruptcy relieves 
the debtor from all debts that arose before bankruptcy.39 Individuals 
filing under Chapter 7 are discharged of all pre-petition debts, save for 
limited exceptions provided in the Bankruptcy Code.40 In a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, confirmation of a plan of reorganization discharges the 
debtor, usually a corporation, from all debts arising prior to the date of 
confirmation.41 
Section 1141(d)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that 
confirmation of a claim discharges “any debt that arose before the date 
of” confirmation of the bankruptcy.42 Debt is defined as liability on a 
claim.43 The Code further defines a claim as follows: 
                                                 
35 Losch, supra note 31, at 143. 
36 See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988); H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-595, at 133-39 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5973–74. 
37 Kathryn R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies, 67 
AM. BANKR. L. J. 69, 93 (1993). 
38 Section 1328 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides a discharge of all 
allowable debts: “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided 
for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
39 Id. 
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006). Nondischargeable claims include child 
support, judgments for accidents involving drunk driving, certain taxes, and debts 
incurred illegally or by fraud. 
41 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
42 Id. 
  43 Id. § 101(12). For purposes of identifying claims, federal bankruptcy, rather 
than state law, applies. See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) 
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(A) [a] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced 
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, 
secured, or unsecured; or 
(B) [a] right to an equitable remedy for breach of 
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, 
whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to 
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, secured, or unsecured.44  
 
Congress expressed its clear intention that the definition of claim be 
interpreted broadly, stating “the bill contemplates that all legal 
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be 
able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.”45  
The usual interpretation of section 101(5)(B) is that if a holder 
of an equitable claim cannot obtain an equitable remedy but can obtain 
a money judgment instead, then the claim is dischargeable.46 The 
seemingly simple statutory interpretation has been complicated by the 
inconsistent judicial history of equitable claims in bankruptcy. A claim 
arises, for bankruptcy purposes, “when ‘the relationship between the 
debtor and creditor contain[s] all of the elements necessary to give rise 
to a legal obligation . . . under the relevant non-bankruptcy law.’”47 
                                                                                                                   
(quoting Arlene Elgart Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and 
Environmental Laws, 46 BUS. LAW. 623, 651 (1991)) (“The determination of when a 
claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy 
law and should not be governed by the particular state or nonCode federal law giving 
rise to the claim. The reason for this is that the Code definition of ‘claim’ expressly 
includes rights to payment or equitable relief that are unmatured or unliquidated. 
Most state or nonCode federal statutes are only concerned with claims that have 
matured or been liquidated”). 
44 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)–(B). 
45 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266. 
46 United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 2009). 
47 In re Duplan Corp., 212 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Chateaugay 
Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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The relevant non-bankruptcy legal obligation must arise prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition.48 
The bankruptcy discharge is primarily associated with Chapter 
7 debtors who liquidate their assets in exchange for relief from the 
burden of their debts, but is an equally important principle for debtors 
attempting reorganization under Chapter 11.49 Reorganization under 
Chapter 11 is most often used by debtors who wish to continue doing 
business but cannot meet obligations to their creditors.50 Chapter 11 
reorganization provides payments to the debtor’s creditors in 
accordance with a reorganization plan submitted to the creditors for 
vote and approved by the bankruptcy court.51 In a Chapter 11 
reorganization, debtors plan the repayment of their debts with the 
expectation that their debts will be discharged.52 Consequently, the 
guarantee of dischargeability is important for debtors who are trying to 
determine how best to dispose of bad debt and restructure the rest of 
their obligations for future financial health.53 
 Outside of the bankruptcy discharge, the bankruptcy courts 
have general equitable powers under section 105 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which states: “the court may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
the title.”54 The court may thus enjoin any action where it is 
appropriate.55 
As a general rule, when Congress empowers the federal courts 
to grant equitable remedies, the courts are presumed to be authorized 
to exercise their full equitable authority unless Congress clearly 
                                                 
48 See In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992). 
49 Debra L. Baker, Bankruptcy—the Last Environmental Loophole?, 34 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 379, 385 (1993). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See Brett Ludwig, Comment, In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group: 
Sacrificing Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans to Delinquently Asserted Setoff Rights, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 871, 876–77 (1993). 
53 Id. at 877. 
54 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
55 Heidt, supra note 37, at 80.  
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indicates otherwise.56 This equitable authority includes the power to 
order prohibitory and mandatory injunctions, writs of mandamus, and 
restitutionary damages.57 Courts are limited in their broad discretion 
from awarding compensatory or punitive damages.58 
Claims for contribution to environmental cleanup costs clearly 
fall within the scope of section 105(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.59 
Such claims are, by their very nature, rights to payment.60 
Environmental injunctions, on the other hand, are a form of equitable 
remedy that fall within the scope of section 105(B).61 In contrast 
claims under section 105(A), which are rights to payment by 
definition, not all injunctions are righ 62
to 
ts to payment.   
                                                
Although environmental injunctions may differ significantly in 
both form and cost from other equitable relief, public policy 
supporting environmental cleanup does not require that environmental 
claims be treated differently from other claims in bankruptcy, in 




The tension between bankruptcy and environmental principles 
is evident in the goals and obligations of the respective parties.64 The 
Bankruptcy Code aims to repay creditors while providing debtors with 
a fresh economic start.65 In contrast, environmental regulations 
 
56 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(2) (2006). 
57 Randall James Butterfield, Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs Under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to a Persistent 
Problem, 49 VAND. L. REV. 689, 736 (1996). 
58 Id. at 737. 
59 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
60 See Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 587 F. 3d 89, 100 (1st 
Cir. 2009). 
61 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (2006). 
62 See Matter of Udell, 18 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1994) (employer’s right to an 
injunction preventing a former employee from violating a covenant not to compete 
was not a claim under section 105(a)). 
63 See In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991). 
64 Losch, supra note 31, at 144. 
65 See Porter & Thorne, supra note 33, at 68. 
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generally seek to protect public safety and the environment regardless 
of the particular interests of debtors and creditors.66 While this 
admittedly oversimplifies the conflict between bankruptcy and 
environmental laws, it is at precisely this crossroads that courts must 
determine whether the bankruptcy discharge applies to environmental 
injunctions. 
 When the bankrupt debtor is also a polluter under CERCLA or 
another environmental statute, the policy considerations of 
environmental and bankruptcy laws collide. 67 A debtor with limited 
assets must, in a bankruptcy, distribute his assets according to priority 
of claim against him.68 An ideally positioned unsecured creditor 
would benefit from administrative expense status.69 However, because 
many environmental obligations are enormous financial burdens, 
giving those claims administrative priority effectively dwarfs all
unsecured claims.
 other 
                                                
70 Such priority status helps the environmental 
enforcement agencies, but it may ruin a debtor’s attempts at 
reorganization.71 Where the environmental claims are given a larger 
share of the debtor’s assets, this inevitably leaves less to repay other 
creditors who receive a diminished share.72 
 On the contrary, when environmental obligations are pooled 
with other general, unsecured claims, they are often discharged for 
pennies on the dollar.73 Discharging unpaid liability undermines the 
goals of environmental laws to force parties responsible for 
contamination to clean up the polluted sites.74 
 
66 Losch, supra note 31, at 144–45. 
67 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 371. 
68 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2006). Priority claims are ordered as follows: (1) 
domestic support obligations; (2) administrative expenses; (3) “claims” as defined in 
section 502; (4) payment of wages to corporate debtors’ employees; (5) contributions 
to employee benefit plans; (6) claims related to grain storage and fishing; (7) certain 
deposits for real and personal property; and (8) certain taxes.  
69 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 390. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 August, supra note 1, at 74. 
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Bankruptcy issues that prevent or delay enforcement of 
environmental statutes can greatly increase the expenditures related to 
cleanup for those sites.75 Litigation and negotiation costs are largely 
site-specific, and the small number of sites with bankrupt PRPs can 
astronomically raise the overall level of spending on litigation.76 
 Further issues arise in situations where there are multiple 
responsible parties at a given cleanup site. Bankrupt parties who 
cannot contribute to cleanup costs complicate negotiations between the 
remaining parties.77 It can be more difficult to settle claims in cases 
where some of the responsible parties are facing bankruptcy because 
other responsible parties do not want to pay for the insolvent party’s 
share of the cleanup costs.78  
The lower courts weigh the competing interests of the laws 
inconsistently, with conflicting results for debtors. Some courts give 
certain deference to environmental laws, while others favor 
bankruptcy provisions.79 There is also a complex middle ground that 
further confuses the issue.80  
 
D. Judicial History 
 
1. Supreme Court 
 
Ohio v. Kovacs was the first case in which the Supreme Court 
tackled the bankruptcy discharge as it relates to environmental 
                                                 
75 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 14. 
76 In the last 10 years, litigation-related expenses have comprised up to 23% of 
total EPA expenditures. Id. at 12–14. 
77 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LITIGATION HAS DECREASED 
AND EPA NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION ON SITE CLEANUP AND COST ISSUES TO 
ESTIMATE FUTURE PROGRAM FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 34 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09656.pdf (citing reports where the EPA rejected 
settlement proposals from minimally responsible parties where bankrupt owners 
were largely responsible for site contamination but were unable to pay). 
78 Id. at 6. 
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injunctions.81 When this landmark case was decided, it was interpreted 
as a blanket edict that polluting debtors could discharge environmental 
obligations in bankruptcy.82 Over time, however, Kovacs has raised 
more questions than it has answered. 
In Kovacs, the State of Ohio sought a declaration from the 
bankruptcy court that the debtor’s obligation to clean up a 
contaminated site was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.83 The debtor, 
the principal shareholder of the polluting corporation, had previously 
signed a stipulation and judgment requiring him to remove specified 
wastes from the property.84 When the debtor failed to comply with the 
injunction, the State appointed a receiver to take possession of the 
site.85 Prior to completion of the cleanup, the debtor filed for personal 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7, precluding the State from enforcing its 
environmental laws against him.86 The Supreme Court held that 
because the debtor’s cleanup duty had been reduced to a monetary 
obligation, it was a liability on a claim that was dischargeable under 
the Bankruptcy Code.87 
The Kovacs decision most importantly stands for the 
proposition that a debtor cannot maintain an ongoing nuisance in 
direct violation of state environmental laws.88 The state can exercise 
its regulatory powers and force compliance with its laws, even if the 
debtor must expend money to comply.89 Under Kovacs, what the state 
cannot do is force the debtor to pay money to the state; at that point, 
                                                 
81 469 U.S. 274 (1986). 
82 See Richard Allen, Dumping Waste, Discharging Debts: Ohio v. Kovacs 
(Kovacs II), 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 661, 668 (1986); Jeff J. Marwill, Ohio v. Kovacs: 
Financial Freedom for Bankrupt Polluters, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 1069, 1079 (1985). 
83 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276–77. 
84 Id. at 276. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 276 n.1. The bankruptcy court stayed the State’s request to discover the 
debtor’s income and assets. 
87 Id. at 283. 
88 Jason S. Brookner, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: An Overview, 112 
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the state is no longer acting in its role as regulator, and it is instead 
acting as a creditor.90 
The Kovacs Court expressly limited its holding in several 
ways,91 making it difficult to consider as precedent for future cases. 
Several issues were not decided: whether a monetary obligation 
imposed prior to bankruptcy was dischargeable; whether the 
consequences would be different had a receiver not been appointed to 
facilitate the injunction; or whether any environmental claims at all are 
dischargeable.92 The Kovacs Court noted that even if an injunction 
does not facially require payment of money, it still may present a 
“claim.”93 In particular, the Court did not address the issue of whether 
an injunction against further pollution is dischargeable.94 
Kovacs fails to address the situations in which an injunction is 
not automatically dischargeable. The Supreme Court has since never 
addressed the specific issues on which it declined to comment in 
Kovacs. The limited holding in Kovacs has befuddled courts struggling 
to use any shred of guiding light from the Supreme Court in their 
respective analyses.95  
Courts have struggled to identify a uniform legacy for Kovacs. 
In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection, the Supreme Court interpreted dicta in 
Kovacs to mean that the abandonment of property in bankruptcy is 
                                                 
90 Id.  
91 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284. 
92 Id. at 284–85 (“[W]e do not address what the legal consequences would have 
been had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been appointed and a 
trustee had been designated with the usual duties of a bankruptcy trustee . . . . [W]e 
do not hold that the injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the premises 
or against any conduct that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the State's 
waters is dischargeable in bankruptcy; we here address . . . only the affirmative duty 
to clean up the site and the duty to pay money to that end.”). 
93 Id. at 274. 
94 Francis E. Goodwyn, Claims Estimation and the Use of the “Cleanup Trust” 
in Environmental Bankruptcy Cases, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 769, 776 (2001). 
95 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284–85; see In re Alongi, 272 B.R. 148, 156 (Bankr. D. 
Md. 2001) (citing Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284); see also Goodwyn, supra note 94, at 
776–77 (discussing Kovacs and how the Supreme Court limited its holding to the 
facts of the particular case, rather than disposing of potential issues).  
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subject to environmental laws.96 The subject property in Midlantic 
was uncontestedly burdensome and not of value to the bankrupt 
estate.97 The bankruptcy court allowed the trustee in bankruptcy to 
abandon the contaminated site, even though the debtor had done
nothing to remediate the facility.
 
 
rmed.   
                                                
98 The Third Circuit reversed, and the
Supreme Court affi 99
Midlantic seems to advocate a case-by-case approach in which 
courts must balance the environmental violation’s threat to public 
health against the estate’s ability to comply with environmental 
laws.100 Although the Midlantic Court dealt with abandonment of 
debtor property in the bankruptcy estate, and not the discharge of a 
claim for liability post-bankruptcy as in Kovacs, the underlying 
question was the same: who will pay the cleanup costs for the 
contaminated property?101 
 
2. The Circuit Split 
 
The Supreme Court did not, in either Kovacs or Midlantic, 
address the discrete issue of when a claim arises for the purposes of 
bankruptcy. In In re Chateaugay Corp., the Second Circuit considered 
what constituted a claim in the context of a bankrupt debtor who 
 
96 474 U.S. 494, 500–01 (1986) (quoting Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285) (anyone in 
possession of polluted property “must comply with the environmental laws of the 
[s]tate”). 
97 Midlantic, 494 U.S. at 502. 
98 Id. at 498 n.3. 
99 Id. at 498. 
100 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 362–69. Lower courts are divided on 
how to treat the outcome of Midlantic. Some hold that Midlantic requires the trustee 
to bring contaminated property into complete compliance with all environmental 
laws before abandonment. See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943, 946–47 n.1 
(Bankr. W. D. Mich. 1987). Others interpret limiting language in Midlantic to mean 
that the exception applies only where there is an imminent danger to public health 
and safety. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 15 (1988); see also In re Purco, 
Inc., 76 Bankr. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 
Bankr. 268, 271–72 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).  
101 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 369. 
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owned and operated literally dozens of hazardous waste sites.102 The 
Second Circuit held that the EPA’s costs of responding to the 
hazardous waste situations, even those not yet addressed at the time of 
the bankruptcy, involved claims.103 As such, the EPA was required to 
file a proof of claim for each of the sites and stand in line with the 
other creditors in the bankruptcy.104 With respect to injunctions 
requiring the debtor to clean up the waste sites, the Second Circuit 
made the distinction between seeking reimbursement for cleanup and 
accepting payment as an alternative to continued pollution.105 The 
Second Circuit held: 
 
[A] cleanup order that accomplishes the dual objectives of 
removing accumulated wastes and stopping or ameliorating 
ongoing pollution emanating from such wastes is not a 
dischargeable claim. It is true that, if in lieu of such an order, 
EPA had undertaken the removal itself and sued for the 
response costs, its action would have both removed the 
accumulated waste and prevented continued pollution . . . But 
an order to clean up a site, to the extent that it imposes 
obligations distinct from any obligation to stop or ameliorate 
ongoing pollution, is a “claim” if the creditor obtaining the 
order had the option, which CERCLA confers, to do the 
cleanup work itself and sue for response costs, thereby 
converting the injunction into a monetary obligation.106 
 
Finding the logic of the Second Circuit persuasive, the Third 
Circuit held in In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. that a cleanup order 
entered after the bankruptcy bar date is not dischargeable.107 In 
Torwico, the Chapter 11 debtor had owned, but no longer possessed, 
the polluted property. The Third Circuit held that the debtor’s 
                                                 
102 944 F.2d 997, 1006 (2d Cir. 1991). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1004. 
105 Id. at 1008. 
106 Id. 
107 8 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994). 
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obligations under the state’s administrative order requiring the debtor 
to clean up hazardous waste on the polluted property was not a claim 
under the Bankruptcy Code.108 The debtor claimed that because it no 
longer had possession of the cleanup site, it was no longer maintaining 
a nuisance or participating in or responsible for the ongoing release of 
hazardous chemicals at the site.109 The Third Circuit held that 
although the state did not have a right to payment, it had the right to 
force the debtor to comply with existing environmental laws, even if 
the debtor expended money to c 110omply.  
                                                
The Third Circuit centered its analysis on the State of New 
Jersey’s regulatory role. The court found that if the State could force 
the debtor to pay money to the State, it would cease to be merely a 
regulator and would take on the role of creditor.111 So while forcing 
compliance is within the power of the State as regulator, including 
forcing the debtor to expend money to comply with court orders, the 
State cannot force the debtor to pay money directly to the state.112 
Interestingly, the Court held that the cleanup obligation was not a right 
to payment, even though that option was available to the State.113 The 
State could have, under the Act, cleaned up the hazardous waste and 
then sought reimbursement, which would be a judicial right to 
payment.114  
The Third Circuit rejected the debtor’s contention that Kovacs 
applied to the cleanup obligation, agreeing with the state that Kovacs 
was not applicable because the state was not seeking a money 
judgment, but only seeking to remedy the ongoing pollution by forcing 
 
108 Id. at 148. 
109 Id. at 151. 
110 Id. at 150. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 150. 
113 Id. at 151 n.6 (“The parties dispute[d] whether, if the state has an ‘alternate 
payment remedy’ the order becomes a ‘claim.’”); see In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 
F.2d 997, 1008 (“[T]o the extent that [an order] imposes obligations distinct from 
any obligation to stop or ameliorate ongoing pollution, [it] is a ‘claim’ if the creditor 
obtaining the order had the option . . . to do the cleanup work itself and sue for 
response costs”). 
114 Torwico, 8 F.3d at 151. 
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the debtor to clean up the site.115 Under New Jersey law, the 
environmental obligations of the polluting company ran with the waste 
and not the land.116 Thus, the debtor company was responsible for the 
cleanup even though it was no longer in possession of the land.117 
The Sixth Circuit has held oppositely. In United States v. 
Whizco, Inc., the government sought to enjoin the defendant, a coal 
company, to obey orders of the Secretary of the Interior requiring the 
defendants to satisfy their statutory obligation to reclaim their 
abandoned coal mine.118 The court held that the former operator of the 
coal mine was required to reclaim the abandoned site, even though the 
mine had been liquidated, but made the point of distinguishing 
enforcement obligations that required performance from those that 
were monetary obligations: “to the extent that fulfilling his obligation 
to reclaim the site would force the defendant to spend money, the 
obligation [i]s a liability on a claim as defined by the Bankruptcy 
Code.”119 Whizco suggests that all claims in which the defendant must 
spend money are rights to payment as defined in section 101(5).120  
The Whizco position favors debtors in bankruptcy, because it 
follows “fresh start” principles. As such, Whizco has been argued 
many times by bankrupt debtors trying to resolve environmental 
claims in court.121 However, most courts have declined to follow the 
Sixth Circuit’s distinction between money claims and injunctive 
relief.122 
                                                 
115 Id. at 149. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 841 F.2d 147, 147 (6th Cir. 1988). 
119 Id. at 151. 
120 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).  
121 See, e.g. Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 
2001) (distinguishing Whizco’s reclamation order from a covenant not to compete); 
City of Toledo v. Rayford, No. L-97-1310, 1998 WL 230450, at *2 (Ohio App. 6 
Dist. May 1, 1998). 
122 United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160 (W.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d, 928 F.2d 
1131 (3d Cir. 1991) (cessation order demanded performance, not payment, and thus, 
the obligations were not “claims” within meaning of Bankruptcy Code); In re 
Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“claims for injunctive relief for which creditors had option of converting injunction 
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3. The Seventh Circuit 
 
 The Seventh Circuit has previously considered environmental 
claims in bankruptcy, with varying results. In In re Chicago, 
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (Chicago I)123 and 
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company 
(Chicago II), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the discharge of CERCLA 
claims.124 The court held that a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes 
when the claimant can “tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release 
of a hazardous substance which this potential claimant knows will lead 
to CERCLA response costs.”125 Thus, in Chicago I, because the 
relevant authority waited to file a claim until four years after the 
bankruptcy approval date, the claim was discharged in bankruptcy.126 
The discharge was affirmed in Chicago II, where the court found that 
sufficient information existed, had the plaintiff sought it out, to give at 
least constructive knowledge that it possessed a CERCLA claim prior 
to and during the bankruptcy.127 
The Seventh Circuit held broadly that cost incurred to comply 
with an equitable cleanup order is not equivalent to the right to 
payment.128 In AM International, Inc. v. Datacard Corp, the Seventh 
Circuit considered whether a cleanup order under RCRA was 
converted to a monetary obligation.129 Because only “rights to 
                                                                                                                   
into right to monetary compensation, as could be done if cleanup were performed 
because of potentially responsible party’s failure to do so, constituted claims 
dischargeable in bankruptcy”). 
123 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992). 
124 3 F.3d 200 (7th Cir. 1993). 
125 Chicago I, 974 F.2d at 786. 
126 Id. 
127 Chicago II, 3 F.3d at 203, 207. Prior to the confirmation of the bankruptcy, 
the EPA launched a massive investigation of the site, and a state-commissioned 
study detailing the site's problems was published. Id.  
128 AM Int’l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp, 106 F.3d 1342 (7th Cir. 1997). 
129 Id. at 1348. 
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payment” are dischargeable “claims” for bankruptcy purposes, the 
RCRA injunction was not a claim.130 
In In re CMC Heartland Partners, the Seventh Circuit found in 
favor of the EPA because the CERCLA provision involved created a 
claim “running with the land.”131 The court found that a “statutory 
obligation attached to current ownership of the land survives 
bankruptcy.”132 The court distinguished “claims” in bankruptcy, 
noting that “[t]o the extent [the relevant federal statutory sections] 
require a person to pay money today because of acts before or during 
the reorganization proceedings, CERCLA creates a ‘claim’ in 
bankruptcy.”133 Thus, the court avoided the possibility that a cleanup 
order would be a response to an ongoing threat, and not just a 
repackaged claim for damages.134 
 
II. UNITED STATES V. APEX OIL CO., INC. 
 
In U.S. v. Apex Oil Company, Inc., the United States, seeking 
injunctive relief under the endangerment provision of RCRA, brought 
an action against Apex Oil Company, Inc. (“Apex”).135 Apex was a 
successor company to Clark Oil and Refining Corporation.136 Fifteen 
                                                 
130 Id.; see Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (RCRA does not 
allow a party to clean up site and sue for response costs in lieu of seeking an 
injunction). 
131 966 F.2d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1992). CMC is the successor case to Chicago 
I, 974 F.2d 775. 
132 CMC, 966 F.2d at 1147. 
133 Id. at 1146. 
134 Id. at 1147. 
 135 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987, 6973 (2010); U.S. v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 
579 F.3d 734, 734 (7th Cir. 2009). 
136 Clark Oil Refining Corporation (“Clark Oil”) bought the Hartford Refinery 
in 1967. Apex Oil Company (“Apex Oil”) was a general partnership formed in 1979. 
In 1981, Clark Oil was merged into Apex Acquisition, Inc. and subsequently 
changed its name to Clark Oil and Refining Corporation (“Clark/Apex”). In 1987, 
Apex Oil and most of its subsidiaries, including Clark/Apex, filed for protection 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 1988, Clark/Apex sold the Hartford 
Refinery to yet another incarnation of Clark Oil and Refining Corporation. Apex Oil 
Company, Inc. was incorporated in 1989 and merged into Apex Oil (“Apex”). Apex 
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years after the company’s successful Chapter 11 reorganization, the 
government brought an action against the successor company for 
groundwater contamination at the site of a previously owned oil 
refinery in Hartford, Illinois.137 After a seventeen-day bench trial, the 
district judge found that millions of gallons of oil constituting a 
“hydrocarbon plume” were trapped underground at the site.138 The 
pollution contaminated the groundwater and emitted fumes into the 
surrounding area, creating hazards to health and to the environment.139 
The district judge found that the evidence presented established 
Apex’s liability and that the injunction was appropriate.140  
The question brought before the Seventh Circuit was whether 
the claim had been discharged in Apex’s previous bankruptcy and 
therefore could not serve as the basis for the lawsuit.141 The principal 
issue addressed by the Seventh Circuit was whether the government’s 
claim to an injunction was discharged in bankruptcy, precluding the 
claim from being brought in another lawsuit.142 At the time the 
Government instituted the cause of action, Apex no longer owned the 
property, engaged in refining, or had the in-house capability to clean 
up the contaminated site.143 Apex argued that because it would be 
unable to fulfill its environmental obligations without payment of 
approximately $150 million dollars to an outside contractor, and 
therefore the equitable remedy had been reduced to payment, it was a 
dischargeable claim.144 
                                                                                                                   
is a successor-by-merger to both Clark Oil and Clark/Apex, who collectively owned 
the refinery between September 29, 1967, and November 20, 1988. U.S. v. Apex Oil 
Co., Inc., No. 05-CV-242-DRH, 2008 WL 2945402, at *1–2 (S.D. Ill. July 28, 
2008). 
137 United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 2009). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., No. 05-CV-242-DRH, 2008 WL 
2945402, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 28, 2008). 
141 Apex, 579 F.3d at 735. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 736. 
144 Notably, the government had initially asked for injunctions under either the 
Clean Water Act or CERCLA but changed positions when confronted with Apex’s 
bankruptcy discharge defense. Id. at 737. 
 183
21
Rdzanek: Discharge of RCRA Injunctive Claims in Bankruptcy: The Seventh Ci
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
Judge Posner, writing for the court, explained that the 
definition of a “claim” in section 101(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code 
includes “a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance” 
only if the breach “gives rise to a right to payment.”145 The critical 
inquiry for the statutory interpretation is the meaning of “gives rise to 
a right to payment.”146 The Seventh Circuit read the plain language of 
the statute to mean that if the equitable remedy was unobtainable and 
the holder of an equitable claim could obtain a money judgment 
instead, the claim would give rise to a right to payment and would 
hence be dischargeable.147 
The Seventh Circuit compared the cleanup injunction to other 
equitable remedies that give rise to rights to payment because the 
claimant would be entitled to a money judgment, and it noted that 
certain equitable remedies like backpay orders and orders of equitable 
restitution would be dischargeable if not for explicit statutory authority 
to the contrary.148 Accordingly, only two types of injunctions give rise 
to an alternate right to payment: (1) injunctions that are no longer 
capable of performance, such as an injunction to do something that is 
no longer possible and (2) injunctions that actually call for the 
payment of money.149 The Court specifically rejected the notion that 
equitable remedies are orders to act and are never orders to pay.150 
In contrast to equitable remedies that may be reduced to money 
judgments, the government’s RCRA claim does not entitle the plaintiff 
to demand payment of cleanup costs in lieu of the defendant cleaning 
up the site, either by doing the cleanup itself or by paying a third 
party.151 Because RCRA does not authorize any form of monetary 
                                                 
145 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B); Apex, 579 F.3d at 735. 
146 Apex, 579 F.3d at 736. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.; see In re Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (a money judgment to 
the value of the equitable remedy or claim is a right to receive payment and is 
dischargeable in bankruptcy); UFG, LLC v. Sw. Corp., 848 N.E.2d 353, 363, 365 
(Ind. App. 2006) (decree for specific performance that could not be performed and 
thus entitled the plaintiff to a money judgment was dischargeable). 
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relief, the Seventh Circuit concluded that that the cleanup order at 
issue could not be deemed a right to payment.152 
The RCRA provision that was the basis of the government’s 
equitable claim did not entitle the government to a demand for any 
monetary relief, although it did entitle the plaintiff to equitable relief 
in the form of money.153 As such, the government’s equitable claim 
entitled the government to require Apex to clean up the site at Apex’s 
expense.154 
The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. to support its interpretation that section 
6973(a) did not authorize monetary relief.155 Meghrig interpreted 
RCRA’s companion provision authorizing private suits as not 
authorizing monetary relief.156 The relevant language from the two 
statutes is identical.157 The Seventh Circuit concluded on this basis 
that the government’s equitable claim allowed the court to compel the 
defendant to clean up the contaminated site, and nothing more.158 
The court also rejected Apex’s second argument, that all 
equitable decrees requiring payment for compliance are money claims 
and are therefore dischargeable.159 The court found the position to be 
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code that creates only the limited 
right to the discharge of equitable claims.160 As such, the cost to the 
defendant is not equivalent to a right to payment for the plaintiff.161 
                                                 
152 Id. at 736–37. 
153 Id. at 737. 
154 Id. 
155 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (2006); Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 
479, 483–87 (1996); Apex, 579 F.3d at 737. 




160 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B); Apex, 579 F.3d at 737. 
161 Apex, 579 F.3d at 737; see AM Int’l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 
1348 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994); In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1145–
47 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1186–87 
(5th Cir. 1986); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 278–79 (3d 
Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160, 164 and n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d, 928 
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The Court explained, “[a]lmost every equitable decree imposes a cost 
on the defendant, whether the decree requires him to do something, as 
in this case, or, as is more common, to refrain from doing 
something.”162 
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Ohio v. Kovacs, in which 
the receiver that had been appointed was seeking money for the 
injunction instead of an order for cleanup.163 The claim was a right to 
payment.164 Here, the government was not seeking money, and the 
injunction therefore did not entitle a right to payment that would be 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.165 In Apex, the EPA merely sought 
cleanup of the contaminated site, whereas the receiver in Kovacs 
sought money for cleanup.166 The court dismissed the notion that the 




Apex’s argument failed because it attempted to distinguish the 
environmental injunction under RCRA from all other equitable 
claims.168 Under the current statutory makeup of the Bankruptcy 
Code, however, distinguishing between equitable claims is simpl
possible.
y not 
                                                                                                                  
169 The Seventh Circuit found definitively: 
 
 
F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990), aff’d, 944 F. 2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). 





167 Id. The Seventh Circuit also rejected Apex’s alternative argument that the 
injunction itself is vague and violates Rule 65(d) of the civil rules requiring that an 
injunction “state its terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail—and not 
by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or 
required.” Apex, 579 F.3d at 739. The issue is not addressed in this Note. 
168 Id. at 736. 
169 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). 
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The distinctions that Apex suggests to limit the scope of a 
position that it realizes is untenable (that all equitable claims 
are dischargeable in bankruptcy in the absence of a specific 
exception in the Code)—between injunctions to do and 
injunctions not to do, between injunctions that require major 
expenditures and those that require minor ones, between 
injunctions that the defendant can comply with internally and 
injunctions that it has to hire an independent contractor in 
order to achieve compliance with—are arbitrary.170 
 
The root arbitrariness of Apex’s position is that neither the 
Bankruptcy Code nor RCRA make any legal distinction for the 
manner in which the cleanup occurs.171 The Seventh Circuit 
underscored that adopting Apex’s position would encourage polluters 
to remain without internal cleanup capacity.172 The cleanup costs exist 
whether they are paid for by the polluter or someone else. As the 
polluter most responsible for the environmental damage, Apex’s 
cleanup obligation withstands bankruptcy.173 Were the court to adopt 
Apex’s position, it is unlikely that the state could effectively enforce 
its laws.174 The argument that any order requiring the debtor to expend 
money creates a dischargeable claim is untenable, because virtually all 
enforcement actions impose some cost on the violator.175 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that all equitable decrees impose 
costs on the defendants, and that discharge generally must be limited 
to cases where the claim gives rise to a right to payment.176 This 
position is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s previous decisions 
regarding the dischargeability of environmental claims in bankruptcy. 
The court clearly followed its own precedent in In re CMC Heartland 
                                                 
170 Apex, 579 F.3d at 738. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 737. 
174 Id. 
175  See In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d 146, 150 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994). 
176 Apex, 579 F.3d at 738. 
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Partners, which held that the statutory cleanup obligation that attached 
to current ownership of the land survived bankruptcy, 177 and AM 
International, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., where that cost incurred to 
comply with a RCRA injunction was not equivalent to the right to 
payment.178 
The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on its own precedent is 
indicative of the lack of guidance from higher authority, namely the 
Supreme Court or Congress. While the Seventh Circuit correctly 
interpreted the statutory language, other Circuits are still relying on the 
spotty lineage of cases following Kovacs to make conflicting decisions 
about the dischargeability of environmental claims. 
The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on its own precedent, and 
similar lines of cases in other circuits, indicates that there is no unified 
approach to environmental claims in bankruptcy. The Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis is supported by some of the circuits, but starkly 
contrasted by the Sixth. Beginning with the latter, the Seventh Circuit 
explicitly rejected Apex’s attempt to support its position with United 
States v. Whizco, Inc.179  
Whizco suggests that all claims where the defendant must 
spend money in order to comply with the court’s orders are rights to 
payment.180 The question presented in Whizco—whether the discharge 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply to mandatory injunctive 
relief that cannot be performed personally and would require a debtor 
in a chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy to spend money—is comparable 
to that in Apex.181 The facts of Whizco are also similar to those in 
Apex, as the debtor in Whizco had surrendered the property in 
question, as well as all the mining equipment, in his bankruptcy.182 
The debtor no longer had the physical ability to perform the 
reclamation nor the right to enter the polluted site.183 Further, the 
                                                 
177 966 F.2d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1992). 
178 106 F.3d 1342, 1348–49 (7th Cir. 1997). 
179 841 F.2d 147, 147 (6th Cir. 1988). 
180 Id. at 151. 
181 Id. at 147; see Apex, 579 F.3d at 735. 
182 Whizco, 841 F.2d at 149; see generally Apex, 579 F.3d 735. 
183 Whizco, 841 F.2d at 149. 
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debtor lacked the financial ability to post bond or to hire a third party 
to perform the cleanup work.184  
The Sixth Circuit relied on Kovacs in holding that the debtor’s 
obligation to comply with the injunction was discharged in 
bankruptcy.185 According to the court, the petitioner in Whizco 
essentially sought from the respondent debtor only a monetary 
payment and that such a required payment was a liability on a claim 
that was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.186 Like Kovacs, 
where the State of Ohio was essentially trying to obtain a money 
payment from the debtor, the debtor in Whizco could not personally 
clean up the waste he wrongfully released into the environment.187 As 
such, the Sixth Circuit determined that the redress sought by the 
government was actually a money claim and dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.188 
The Sixth Circuit rejected Whizco, Inc.’s argument that an 
injunctive order should be discharged only when the government has 
an alternative right to payment of money in lieu of compelling the 
operator or his agent to perform his reclamation duties.189 The Sixth 
Circuit held:  
 
Although the terms of the injunction would not require the 
payment of money, to the extent that the injunction were to be 
effective, it would. . . . Thus, when we look at the substance 
of what the plaintiff seeks, rather than the form of the relief 
sought, we see that the plaintiff is really seeking payment.190  
 
The Whizco court determined that money payment was a claim, 
regardless of the form of the court order demanding cleanup.191 The 
                                                 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 (1986); Whizco, 841 F.2d at 149. 
187 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 287–88; Whizco, 841 F.2d at 149. 
188 Whizco, 841 F.2d at 150. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 151. 
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distinction between form and substance makes practical sense. An 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that turns on the debtor’s 
financial reality is preferable for debtors who are legally liable but 
practically unable to pay for the environmental cleanup that would 
inevitably be performed by government agencies. 
 The Sixth Circuit applied Kovacs more literally than the 
Seventh Circuit, finding that the substance of the claim—namely, the 
money expense—governs over the form of the court order.192 While 
most courts begin inquiry into environmental matters in bankruptcy 
with a discussion of Kovacs, the Seventh Circuit stepped away from 
that approach.193 Instead, the Seventh Circuit turned to the statutory 
language of RCRA and the Bankruptcy Code.194  
The key difference between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ 
study of Kovacs is that the Sixth Circuit interpreted the case without 
respect to the appointment of the receiver,195 while the Seventh Circuit 
in Apex found that the appointment of a receiver transferred the power 
to make money claims out of the hands of the debtor, and therefore 
was inapplicable to the present case.196 Had the Whizco court 
considered the receiver’s role as intermediary seeking payment for the 
environmental cleanup, the court may have come to the same 
conclusion as the Seventh Circuit. 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis mirrors that of the Third Circuit 
in In re Torwico Electronics, Inc.197 In Torwico, the court applied an 
environmental law similar to the RCRA provision that limits claims to 
injunctive relief.198 The Third Circuit reasoned that because the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy 
(NJDEPE) could not force the debtor to pay money to the State, the 
cleanup costs were not a claim in bankruptcy.199 NJDEPE had no right 
                                                 
192 United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1988). 
193 United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 2009). 
194 Id. 
195 Whizco, 841 F.2d at 149. 
196 Apex, 579 F.3d at 737. 
197 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993). 
198 Id. 
199 Torwico, 8 F.3d at 150. 
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to payment, because its authority was limited to enforcement of the 
laws requiring the debtor to clean up the hazardous wastes for which it 
was responsible under state law.200 The court in Torwico stated that 
much like the remedy at issue in Apex, “it is clear that the state 
demanded not that Torwico pay money over to the state, but rather that 
it take action to ameliorate ongoing hazard.”201  
 Both the Sixth Circuit’s substance/form distinction and the 
Seventh Circuit’s determination that an injunction is not a universal 
right to payment have significant policy implications. If a debtor’s 
environmental obligations are dischargeable, as advocated by the Sixth 
Circuit, the entire burden of reclaiming and cleaning up the polluted 
sites falls on the government.202 Such policy decisions are the 
responsibility of Congress, which could easily modify the Bankruptcy 
Code with a specific provision stating that a debtor may not discharge 
his cleanup obligations. While a statutory mandate requiring 
compliance with environmental acts would further the aims of 
environmental policy, it would be devastating to both debtors and 
other creditors in bankruptcy. Environmental injunctions and cleanup 
orders often amount to exponential costs203 that, if allowed to take 
administrative priority, would mean that fewer debtors would be able 
to reorganize and more would be forced to liquidate.204 Further, in 
liquidation, the high costs of environmental obligations would leave 
little if anything for the debtor’s unsecured creditors.205 
The relatively simple legal issue in Apex implicates 
complicated equitable principles in bankruptcy and environmental law. 
Although the Seventh Circuit was correct in affirming the injunction 
against Apex, the case highlights several of the issues that 
continuously plague polluters entering bankruptcy or those who have 
already gone through bankruptcy.  
                                                 
200 Id. at 148. 
201 Id. at 150. 
202 See United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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 First, the Apex holding puts the post-bankruptcy debtor in the 
position where they can be blindsided by astronomical cleanup 
costs.206 Bankruptcy courts confirm only those bankruptcy plans that 
feasibly pay all preferred creditors and claims, and then discharge the 
remaining debt.207 A debtor must be aware of all claims, potential 
liabilities, and debts that exist or potentially exist prior to the 
bankruptcy in order to plan reorganization.208 Debtors cannot 
anticipate a complete discharge if they do not know the status of their 
potential environmental liability.209 Without an accurate forecast of 
potential liabilities, debtors may end up grossly miscalculating their 
assets. 
Thus, even the best-intentioned debtor can fall prey to a huge 
claim under the expectation of a complete discharge. Apex argued that 
had it known in 1986 that it would be liable for $150 million in 
cleanup costs, it would have had to undergo a Chapter 7 liquidation 
rather than a Chapter 11 reorganization, because it could not have 
successfully reorganized with the additional, non-dischargeable 
debt.210 Without a successor or surviving entity to take over liability 
for the cleanup, the full expense of the operation would fall on the 
government. 
Of course, environmental statutes such as CERCLA and 
RCRA hold parties accountable regardless of financial status.211 The 
concept of the PRP mandates joint and several liability for all 
responsible parties without reference to business organization.212 
More troubling for the debtor, Apex provides little hope that 
debtors may ever be able to discharge liability for RCRA claims. By 
simply structuring the cause of action as a RCRA injunctive suit rather 
than attempting to obtain a money judgment under CERCLA or a 
different statute, government agencies can ensure debtor compliance, 
                                                 
206 United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 2009). 
207 Heidt, supra note 37, at 122. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Apex, 579 F.3d at 736. 
211 Heidt, supra note 37, at 72. 
212 Id. at 89. 
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even where it may not be the most equitable outcome for the parties 
involved. In Apex, the government originally filed its claim under 
CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, but repleaded when confronted 
with Apex’s bankruptcy defense.213 A claim under the relevant 
CERCLA provision could be converted to a money judgment, which is 
a claim for bankruptcy purposes.214 The corresponding RCRA claim 
does not have a money judgment as an available remedy.215 Filing the 
cleanup action under RCRA essentially guaranteed that Apex would 
not be discharged of liability. 
Based on statutory purpose alone, CERCLA is a more 
appropriate statute under which to file than RCRA because its 
purposes are cleanup and remediation instead of prevention of future 
pollution.216 RCRA’s limited remedial structure can be somewhat 
explained by the correspondingly broad citizen suit provisions.217 
Further, unlike CERCLA, which imposes broad liability on both the 
current owner of the polluted land as well as the responsible parties, 
RCRA aims to reduce environmental damages by regulating potential 
polluters.218 Because it failed to overcome the issue in litigation,219 
Apex’s attempt to avoid liability for the cleanup was doomed from the 
start. 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Apex is an unpleasant 
precedent for polluters. Although the government may file RCRA 
                                                 
213 Apex, 579 F.3d at 737. 
214 Butterfield, supra note 57, at 701. 
215 Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1094 (8th Cir. 1995) (RCRA “does not give 
the district courts express authority in citizen suits to award money judgments for 
costs incurred in cleaning up contaminated sites. Thus, if such a remedy is to be 
available, we must find either that Congress, by authorizing the district court ‘to 
order … such other action as may be necessary,’ . . . implicitly created such a 
remedy, or that the ‘cause of action … may have become a part of the federal 
common law through the exercise of judicial power to fashion appropriate remedies 
for unlawful conduct”’ (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of 
Am., 451 U.S. 77, 90 (1981)).  
216 Butterfield, supra note 57, at 701. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., No. 05-CV-242-DRH, 2008 WL 
2945402, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 28, 2008). 
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claims, Congress intended that RCRA enforcement be a partnership 
between state and federal governments, with the state taking primary 
responsibility for implementation.220 The government selectively filed 
a claim under RCRA when confronted with Apex’s bankruptcy 
defense.221 The resulting Seventh Circuit decision gives the 
government carte blanche to shoehorn responsive claims into what is 
meant to be a preventative statute, for the purpose of avoiding 
bankruptcy defenses.  
Although it will not resolve the conflicting principles between 
bankruptcy and environmental law, decreasing the number of bankrupt 
parties saddled with environmental liability would serve to partially 
ameliorate the problem. The EPA reported in 2005 that implementing 
a 1980 statutory mandate under CERCLA requiring businesses 
handling hazardous substances to provide assurance of their financial 
responsibility could help reduce the risk overall that companies 
entering bankruptcy would be responsible for costly environmental 
cleanup.222 This would also reduce the risk that the general public 





Although denying that a $150 million cleanup order is a “right 
to payment”—as the Seventh Circuit did in Apex—may seem initially 
adverse to the traditional prospect of a dischargeable claim, the 
Seventh Circuit was correct to affirm the district’s decision for at least 
two reasons. First, the Bankruptcy Code and relevant RCRA 
                                                 
220 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 359; Randolph L. Hill, An Overview 
of RCRA: The “Mind-Numbing” Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental 
Statute, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10254 n.160 (1991). 
221 Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 359 (RCRA’s “cradle to grave” 
regulatory scheme is intended to prevent the types of untreated releases that 
CERCLA is designed to clean up). 
222 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: 
EPA SHOULD DO MORE TO ENSURE THAT LIABLE PARTIES MEET THEIR CLEANUP 
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provisions are blind to the financial status of a debtor in what is a 
purely equitable claim. Second, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kovacs does not provide a blueprint for this type of environmental 
injunction in a bankruptcy case. 
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision was legally correct, there 
are equitable concerns that span beyond the simple statutory analysis 
of the Bankruptcy Code. The injunction against Apex forces the 
company to spend vastly outside of its fiscal bankruptcy plan. As such, 
the debtor did not receive a “fresh start” in this case. In a cross section 
of law where one party gets the short end of the stick, the debtor 
company in this case certainly received just that. Apex highlights the 
tension between the competing purposes of bankruptcy and 
environmental law. Until the issue is further treated by either the 
Supreme Court or by Congress, the status of environmental claims in 
bankruptcy will remain uncertain. 
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